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Abstract—This paper considers a statistical signal processing
problem involving agent based models of financial markets
which at a micro-level are driven by socially aware and risk-
averse trading agents. These agents trade (buy or sell) stocks
by exploiting information about the decisions of previous agents
(social learning) via an order book in addition to a private (noisy)
signal they receive on the value of the stock. We are interested
in the following: (1) Modelling the dynamics of these risk averse
agents, (2) Sequential detection of a market shock based on the
behaviour of these agents.
Structural results which characterize social learning under a
risk measure, CVaR (Conditional Value-at-risk), are presented
and formulation of the Bayesian change point detection problem
is provided. The structural results exhibit two interesting prop-
erties: (i) Risk averse agents herd more often than risk neutral
agents (ii) The stopping set in the sequential detection problem is
non-convex. The framework is validated on data from the Yahoo!
Tech Buzz game dataset and it is revealed that (a) The model
identifies the value changes based on agent’s trading decisions.
(b) Reasonable quickest detection performance is achieved when
the agents are risk-averse.
Index Terms—conditional value at risk (CVaR), social learning
filter, market shock, quickest detection, agent based models,
monotone Bayesian update
I. INTRODUCTION
Financial markets evolve based on the behaviour of a large
number of interacting entities. Understanding the interaction
of these agents is therefore essential in statistical inference
from financial data. This motivates the study of “agent based
models” for financial markets. Agent based models are useful
for capturing the global behaviour of highly interconnected
financial systems by simulating the behaviour of the local
interacting systems [1], [2], [3], [4]. Unlike standard economic
models which emphasize the equilibrium properties of finan-
cial markets, agent based models stress local interactions and
out-of-equilibrium dynamics that may not reach equilibrium
in the long run [5]. Agent based models are commonly used
to determine the conditions that lead a group of interacting
agents to form an aggregate behaviour [6], [7], [8], [9] and to
model stylized facts like correlation of returns and volatility
clustering [10], [11]. Agent based models have also been
used model anomalies that the standard approaches fail to
explain like “fat tails”, absence of simple arbitrage, gain/loss
asymmetry and leverage effects [12], [13].
In this paper, we are interested in developing agent based
models for studying global events in financial markets where
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the underlying value of the stock experiences a jump change
(shock). Market shocks are known to affect stock market
returns [14], cause fluctuations in the economy [15] and
necessitate market making [16]. Therefore detecting shocks is
essential and when the interacting agents are acting based on
private signals and complete history of other agents’ trading
decisions, it is non-trivial [17].
The problem of market shock detection in the presence of
social learning considered in this paper is different from a
standard signal processing (SP) problem in the following ways:
1) Agents (or social sensors) influence the behaviour of
other agents, whereas in standard SP sensors typically
do not affect other sensors.
2) Agents reveal quantized information (decisions) and have
dynamics, whereas in standard SP sensors are static with
the dynamics modelled in the state equation.
3) Standard SP is expectation centric. In this paper we use
coherent risk measures which generalizes the concept of
expected value and is much more relevant in financial
applications. Such coherent risk measures [18] are now
widely used in finance to model risk averse behaviour.
Properties 1 and 2 above are captured by social learning
models. Such social learning models, where agents face fixed
prices, are considered in [19], [20], [21], [9]. They show
that after a finite amount of time, an informational cascade
takes place and all subsequent agents choose the same action
regardless of their private signal. Models where agents act
sequentially to optimize local costs (to choose an action) and
are socially aware were considered in [7], [22]. This paper
considers a similar model, but, in order to incorporate property
3 above (risk averse behaviour), we will replace the classical
social learning model of expected cost minimizers to that
of risk averse minimizers. The resulting risk-averse social
learning filter has several interesting (and unusual) properties
that will be discussed in the paper.
Main Results and Organization
Section II presents the social learning agent based model
and the market observer’s objective for detecting shocks.
The formulation involves the interaction of local and global
decision makers. Individual agents perform social learning
and the market maker seeks to determine if the underlying
asset value has changed based on the agent behaviour. The
shock in the asset value changes at a phase distributed time
(which generalizes geometric distributed change times). The
problem of market shock detection considered in this paper is
different from the classical Bayesian quickest detection [23],
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2[24], [25] where, local observations are used to detect the
change. Quickest detection in the presence of social learning
was considered in [17] where it was shown that making global
decisions (stop or continue) based on local decisions (buy or
sell) leads to discontinuous value function and the optimal
policy has multiple thresholds. However, unlike [17] which
deals with expected cost, we consider a more general measure
to account for the local agents’ attitude towards risk.
It is well documented in various fields like economics
[26], behavioural economics, psychology [27] that people
prefer a certain but possibly less desirable outcome over an
uncertain but potentially larger outcome. To model this risk
averse behaviour, commonly used risk measures1 are Value-at-
Risk (VaR), Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR), Entropic risk
measure and Tail value at risk; see [28]. We consider social
learning under CVaR risk measure. CVaR [29] is an extension
of VaR that gives the total loss given a loss event and is a
coherent risk measure [18]. In this paper, we choose CVaR
risk measure as it exhibits the following properties [18], [29]:
(i) It associates higher risk with higher cost. (ii) It ensures
that risk is not a function of the quantity purchased, but arises
from the stock. (iii) It is convex. CVaR as a risk measure has
been used in solving portfolio optimization problems [30], [31]
credit risk optimization [32], order execution [33] and also to
optimize an insurer’s product mix [34]. For an overview of
risk measures and their application in finance, see [28].
Section III provides structural results which characterize the
social learning under CVaR risk measure and its properties.
We show that, under reasonable assumptions on the costs,
the trading decisions taken by socially aware and risk-averse
agents are ordinal functions of their private observations and
monotone in the prior information. This implies that the
Bayesian social learning follows simple intuitive rules. The
change point detection problem is formulated as a Market Ob-
server2 seeking to detect a shock in the stock value (modelled
as a Markov chain) by balancing the natural trade-off between
detection delay and false alarm.
Section IV discusses the unusual properties exhibited by the
CVaR social learning filter and explores the link between local
and global behaviour in agent based models for detection of
market shocks. We show that the stopping region for the se-
quential detection problem is non-convex; this is in contrast to
standard signal processing quickest detection problems where
the stopping set is convex. Similar results were developed in
[17], [35], [36].
Finally, Section V discusses an application of the agent
based model and change detection framework in a stock
market data set. We use a data set from Tech Buzz Game which
is a stock market simulation launched by Yahoo! Research
1A risk measure % : L → R is a mapping from the space of measurable
functions to the real line which satisfies the following properties: (i) %(0) = 0.
(ii) If S1, S2 ∈ L and S1 ≤ S2 a.s then %(S1) ≤ %(S2). (iii) if a ∈ R
and S ∈ L, then %(S + a) = %(S) + a. The risk measure is coherent if in
addition % satisfies: (iv) If S1, S2 ∈ L, then %(S1 + S2) ≤ %(S1) + %(S1).
(v) If a ≥ 0 and S ∈ L, then %(aS) = a%(S). The expectation operator is
a special case where subadditivity is replaced by additivity.
2The market observer could be the securities dealer (investment bank or
syndicate) that underwrites the stock which is later traded in a secondary
market.
and O’Reilly Media to gain insights into forecasting high-
tech events and trades. Tech Buzz uses Dynamic parimutuel
markets (DPM) as its trading mechanism. DPMs are known to
provide accurate predictions in field studies on price formation
in election stock markets [37], mechanism design for sales
forecasting [38] and betting in sports markets [39], [40].
II. CVAR SOCIAL LEARNING MODEL AND MARKET
OBSERVER’S OBJECTIVE
This section presents the Bayesian social learning model
and defines the objective of the market observer. As will
be shown later in Section III, the model results in ordinal
decision making thereby mimicking human behavior and the
risk measure captures a trader’s attitude towards risk.
A. CVaR Social Learning Model
The market micro-structure is modelled as a discrete time
dealer market motivated by algorithmic and high-frequency
tick-by-tick trading [41]. There is a single traded stock
or asset, a market observer and a countable number of
trading agents. The asset has an initial true underlying value
x0 ∈ X = {1, 2, . . . , X}. The market observer does not
receive direct information about x ∈ X but only observes the
public buy/sell actions of agents, ak ∈ A = {1(buy), 2(sell)}.
The agents themselves receive noisy private observations of
the underlying value x and consider this in addition to the
trading decisions of the other agents visible in the order book
[42], [43], [44], [45]. At a random time, τ0 determined by
the transition matrix P , the asset experiences a jump change
in its value to a new value. The aim of the market observer
is to detect the change time (global decision) with minimal
cost, having access to only the actions of these socially aware
agents. Let yk ∈ Y = {1, 2, . . . , Y } denote agent k’s private
observation. The initial distribution is pi0 = (pi0(i), i ∈ X )
where pi0(i) = P(x0 = i).
The agent based model has the following dynamics:
1. Shock in the asset value: At time τ0 > 0, the asset
experiences a jump change (shock) in its value due to
exogenous factors. The change point τ0 is modelled by
a phase type (PH) distribution. The family of all PH-
distributions forms a dense subset for the set of all
distributions [46] i.e., for any given distribution function
F such that F (0) = 0, one can find a sequence of PH-
distributions {Fn, n ≥ 1} to approximate F uniformly
over [0,∞). The PH-distributed time τ0 can be con-
structed via a multi-state Markov chain xk with state
space X = {1, . . . , X} as follows: Assume state ‘1’ is
an absorbing state and denotes the state after the jump
change. The states 2, . . . , X (corresponding to beliefs
e2, . . . , eX ) can be viewed as a single composite state that
x resides in before the jump. So τ0 = inf{k : xk = 1}
and the transition probability matrix P is of the form
P =
[
1 0
P (X−1)×1 P¯(X−1)×(X−1)
]
(1)
3The distribution of the absorption time to state 1 is
ν0 = pi0(1), νk = p¯i
′
0P¯
k−1P , k ≥ 1, (2)
where p¯i0 = [pi0(2), . . . , pi0(X)]′. The key idea is that by
appropriately choosing the pair (pi0, P ) and the associ-
ated state space dimension X , one can approximate any
given discrete distribution on [0,∞) by the distribution
{νk, k ≥ 0}; see [46, pp.240-243]. The event {xk = 1}
means the change point has occurred at time k according
to PH-distribution (2). In the special case when x is a 2-
state Markov chain, the change time τ0 is geometrically
distributed.
2. Agent’s Private Observation: Agent k’s private (local)
observation denoted by yk is a noisy measurement of the
true value of the asset. It is obtained from the observation
likelihood distribution as,
Bxy = P(yk = y|xk = x) (3)
3. Private Belief update: Agent k updates its private belief
using the observation yk and the prior public belief
pik−1(i) = P(X = i|a1, . . . , ak−1) as the following
Hidden Markov Model update
ηk =
BykP
′pik−1
1′BykP ′pik−1
(4)
4. Agent’s trading decision: Agent k executes an action ak ∈
A = {1(buy), 2(sell)} to myopically minimize its cost.
Let c(i, a) denote the cost incurred if the agent takes
action a when the underlying state is i. Let the local cost
vector be
ca = [c(1, a) c(2, a) . . . c(X, a)] (5)
The costs for different actions are taken as
c(i, j) = pj − βij for i ∈ X , j ∈ A (6)
where βij corresponds to the agent’s demand. Here
demand is the agent’s desire and willingness to trade at
a price pj for the stock. Here p1 is the quoted price for
purchase and p2 is the price demanded in exchange for
the stock. We assume that the price is the same during
the period in which the value changes. As a result, the
willingness of each agent only depends on the degree of
uncertainty on the value of the stock.
Remark. The analysis provided in this paper straight-
forwardly extends to the case when different agents are
facing different prices like in an order book [42], [43],
[45]. For notational simplicity we assume the cost are
time invariant.
The agent considers measures of risk in the presence
of uncertainty in order to overcome the losses incurred
in trading. To illustrate this, let c(x, a) denote the loss
incurred with action a while at unknown and random state
x ∈ X . When an agent solves an optimization problem
involving c(x, a) for selecting the best trading decision,
it will take into account not just the expected loss, but
also the “riskiness” associated with the trading decision
a. The agent therefore chooses an action ak to minimize
the CVaR measure3 of trading as
ak = argmin
a∈A
{CVaRα(c(xk, a))} (7)
= argmin
a∈A
{min
z∈R
{z + 1
α
Eyk [max{(c(xk, a)− z), 0}]}}
Here α ∈ (0, 1] reflects the degree of risk-aversion for the
agent (the smaller α is, the more risk-averse the agent is).
Define
Hk := σ- algebra generated by (a1, a2, . . . , ak−1, yk)
(8)
Eyk denotes the expectation with respect to private belief,
i.e, Eyk = E[.|Hk] when the private belief is updated after
observation yk.
5. Social Learning and Public belief update: Agent k’s
action is recorded in the order book and hence broadcast
publicly. Subsequent agents and the market observer up-
date the public belief on the value of the stock according
to the social learning Bayesian filter as follows
pik = T
pik−1(pik−1, ak) =
R
pik−1
ak P
′pik−1
1′Rpik−1ak P ′pik−1
(9)
Here, Rpik−1ak = diag(P(ak|x = i, pik−1), i ∈ X ), where
P(ak|x = i, pik−1) =
∑
y∈Y
P(ak|y, pik−1)P(y|xk = i) and
P(ak|y, pik−1) =
{
1 if ak = argmin
a∈A
CVaRζ(c(xk, a));
0 otherwise.
Note that pik belongs to the unit simplex Π(X)
∆
={pi ∈
RX : 1′Xpi = 1, 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ X}.
6. Market Observer’s Action: The market observer (se-
curities dealer) seeks to achieve quickest detection by
balancing delay with false alarm. At each time k, the
market observer chooses action4 uk as
uk ∈ U = {1(stop), 2(continue)} (10)
Here ‘Stop’ indicates that the value has changed and the
dealer incorporates this information before selling new
issues to investors. The formulation presented considers
a general parametrization of the costs associated with
detection delay and false alarm costs. Define
Gk := σ- algebra generated by (a1, a2, . . . , ak−1, ak).
(11)
i) Cost of Stopping: The asset experiences a jump
change(shock) in its value at time τ0. If the action
uk = 1 is chosen before the change point, a false
3 For the reader unfamiliar with risk measures, it should be noted that
CVaR is one of the ‘big’ developments in risk modelling in finance in the
last 15 years. In comparison, the value at risk (VaR) is the percentile loss
namely, VaRα(x) = min{z : Fx(z) ≥ α} for cdf Fx. While CVaR is a
coherent risk measure, VaR is not convex and so not coherent. CVaR has
other remarkable properties [29]: it is continuous in α and jointly convex in
(x, α). For continuous cdf Fx, CVaRα(x) = E{X|X > VaRα(x)}. Note
that the variance is not a coherent risk measure.
4It is important to distinguish between the “local” decisions ak of the
agents and “global” decisions uk of the market maker. Clearly the decisions
ak affect the choice of uk as will be made precise below.
4alarm penalty is incurred. This corresponds to the event
∪
i≥2
{xk = i} ∩ {uk = 1}. Let fiI(xk = i, uk = 1)
denote the cost of false alarm in state i, i ∈ X with
fi ≥ 0. The expected false alarm penalty is
C(pik, uk = 1) =
∑
i∈X
fiE{I(xk = i, uk = 1)|Gk}
= f′pik (12)
where f = (f1, . . . , fX) and it is chosen with in-
creasing elements, so that states further from ‘1’ incur
higher penalties. Clearly, f1 = 0.
ii) Cost of delay: A delay cost is incurred when the event
{xk = 1, uk = 2} occurs, i.e, even though the state
changed at k, the market observer fails to identify the
change. The expected delay cost is
C(pik, uk = 2) = dE{I(xk = i, uk = 1)|Gk}
= de′1pik (13)
where d > 0 is the delay cost and e1 denotes the unit
vector with 1 in the first position.
B. Market Observer’s Quickest Detection Objective
The market maker chooses its action at each time k as
uk = µ(pik) ∈ {1(stop), 2(continue)} (14)
where µ denotes a stationary policy. For each initial distribu-
tion pi0 ∈ Π(X) and policy µ, the following cost is associated
Jµ(pi0) = Eµpi0
{
τ−1∑
k=1
ρk−1C(pik, uk = 2) + ρτ−1C(pik, uk = 1)
}
(15)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] denotes an economic discount factor. (As long
as f is non-zero, stopping is guaranteed in finite time and so
ρ = 1 is allowed.)
Given the cost, the market observer’s objective is to deter-
mine τ0 with minimum cost by computing an optimal policy
µ∗ such that
Jµ∗(pi0) = inf
µ∈µJµ(pi0) (16)
The sequential detection problem (16) can be viewed as a
partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP) where
the belief update is given by the social learning filter.
C. Stochastic Dynamic Programming Formulation
The optimal policy of the market observer µ∗ : Π(X) →
{1, 2} is the solution of (15) and is given by Bellman’s
dynamic programming equation as follows:
V (pi) = min
{
C(pi, 1), C(pi, 2) + ρ
∑
a∈A
V (Tpi(pi, a))σ(pi, a)
}
(17)
µ∗(pi) = argmin
{
C(pi, 1), C(pi, 2) + ρ
∑
a∈A
V (Tpi(pi, a))σ(pi, a)
}
where Tpi(pi, a) = R
pi
aP
′pi
1′RpiaP ′pi
is the CVaR-social learning filter.
C(pi, 1) and C(pi, 2) from (12) and (13) are the market
observer’s costs. Here ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor which is
a measure of the degree of impatience of the market observer.
As C(pi, 1) and C(pi, 2) are non-negative and bounded for
pi ∈ Π(X), the stopping time τ is finite for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
The aim of the market observer is then to determine the
stopping set S = {pi ∈ Π(X) : µ∗(pi) = 1} given by:
S =
{
pi : C(pi, 1) < C(pi, 2) + ρ
∑
a∈A
V (Tpi(pi, a))σ(pi, a)
}
III. PROPERTIES OF CVAR SOCIAL LEARNING FILTER
This section discusses the main results regarding the struc-
tural properties of the CVaR social learning filter and high-
lights the significant role it plays in charactering the properties
of market observer’s value function and optimal policy. Ac-
cording to Theorem 1, risk-averse agents take decisions that
are monotone and ordinal in the observations and monotone
in the prior; and its monotone ordinal behaviour implies that
a Bayesian model chosen in this paper is a useful idealization.
A. Assumptions
The following assumptions will be used throughout the
paper:
(A1) Observation matrix B and transition matrix P are TP2
(all second order minors are non-negative)
(A2) Agents’ local cost vector ca is sub-modular. That is
c(x, 2)− c(x, 1) ≤ c(x+ 1, 2)− c(x+ 1, 1).
The matrices being TP2 [47] ensures that the public belief
Bayesian update can be compared with the prior [48] and sub-
modular [49] costs ensure that if it is less risky to choose a = 2
when in x, it is also less risky to choose it when in x+ 1.
B. Properties of CVaR social learning filter
The Y ×A local decision likelihood probability matrix Rpi
(analogous to observation likelihood) can be computed as
Rpi = BMpi,where Mpiy,a
∆
=P(a|y, pi) (18)
P(a|y, pi) = I(CVaRα(c(xk, a)) < CVaRα(c(xk, a′)))
where a′ = A/{a}. Here I denotes the indicator function.
Let Hα(y, a) = CVaRα(c(xk, a)) denote the cost with
CVaR measure, associated with action a and observation y
for convenience i.e,
Hα(y, a) = min
z∈R
{z + 1
α
Ey[max{(c(x, a)− z), 0}]} (19)
Here Ey = E[.|Hk]. y indicates the dependence of E and
hence Hα on the observation. Let a∗(pi, y) = argmin Hα(y, a)
denote the optimal action of the agent with explicit dependence
on the distribution and observation.
The following result says that agents choose a trading deci-
sion that is monotone and ordinal in their private observation.
Humans typically convert numerical attributes to ordinal scales
before making decisions. For example, it does not matter if the
cost of a meal at a restaurant is $200 or $205; an individual
5would classify this cost as “high”. Also credit rating agencies
use ordinal symbols such as AAA, AA, A.
Theorem 1. Under (A1) and (A2), the action a∗(pi, y) made
by each agent is increasing and hence ordinal in y for any
prior belief pi.
Under (A2), a∗(pi, y) is increasing in pi with respect to the
monotone likelihood ratio order (Definition 1 in the appendix).
The proof is given in the appendix. Theorem 1 says that
agents exhibit monotone ordinal behaviour. The condition that
a∗(pi, y) is monotone in the observation y is required to
characterize the local decision matrices on different regions
in the belief space which is stated next.
Theorem 2. Under (A1) and (A2), there are at most Y + 1
distinct local decision likelihood matrices Rpi and the belief
space Π(X) can be partitioned into the following Y + 1
polytopes:
Pα1 = {pi ∈ Π(X) : H(1, 1)−H(1, 2) ≥ 0}
Pαl = {pi ∈ Π(X) : H(l − 1, 1)−H(l − 1, 2) < 0(20)
∩ H(l, 1)−H(l, 2) ≥ 0}, l = 2, . . . , Y
PαY+1 = {pi ∈ Π(X) : H(Y, 1)−H(Y, 2) < 0}
Also, the matrices Rpi are constant on each of these polytopes.
The proof is given in the appendix. Theorem 2 is required
to specify the policy for the market observer. Indeed it leads
to unusual behavior (non-convex) stopping regions in quickest
detection as described in Section IV-B.
IV. SOCIAL LEARNING AND CHANGE DETECTION FOR
RISK-AVERSE AGENTS
This section illustrates the properties of the risk-averse so-
cial learning filter which leads to a non-convex value function
and therefore non-convex stopping set of quickest detection.
A. Social Learning Behavior of Risk Averse Agents
The following discussion highlights the relation between
risk-aversion factor α and the regions Pαl . For a given risk-
aversion factor α, Theorem 2 shows that there are at most
Y +1 polytopes on the belief space. It was shown in [17] that
for the risk neutral case with X = 2, and P = I (the value is
a random variable) the intervals Pα1 and Pα3 correspond to the
herding region and the interval Pα2 corresponds to the social
learning region. In the herding region, the agents take the same
action as the belief is frozen. In the social learning region
there is observational learning. However, when the agents are
optimizing a more general risk measure (CVaR), the social
learning region is different for different risk-aversion factors.
The social learning region for the CVaR risk measure is shown
in Fig. 1. The following parameters were chosen:
B =
[
0.8 0.2
0.3 0.7
]
, P =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, c =
[
1 2
3 0.5
]
.
It can be observed that the width of the social learning region
decreases as α decreases. This can be interpreted as risk-averse
agents showing a larger tendency to go with the crowd rather
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.2
0.3
0.4
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0.6
0.7
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∗
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Fig. 1. The social learning region for α ∈ (0, 1]. It can be seen that the
curves corresponding to pi∗∗ and pi∗ do not intersect and their separation
(social learning region) varies with α. Here P = I , i.e, the value is a random
variable.
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Fig. 2. The social learning region for α ∈ (0, 1]. It can be seen that the
social learning region is absent when agents are sufficiently risk-averse and
is larger when the stock value is known to change, i.e, P 6= I .
than “risk” choosing the other action. With the same B and c
parameters, but with transition matrix
P =
[
1 0
0.1 0.9
]
the social learning region is shown in Fig. 2. From Fig. 2, it is
observed that when the state is evolving and when the agents
are sufficiently risk-averse, social learning region is very small.
It can be interpreted as: agents having a strong risk-averse
attitude don’t prefer to “learn” from the crowd; but rather face
the same consequences, when P 6= I .
B. Nonconvex Stopping Set for Market Shock Detection
We now illustrate the solution to the Bellman’s stochastic
dynamic programming equation (17), which determines the
optimal policy for quickest market shock detection, by consid-
ering an agent based model with two states. Clearly the agents
(local decision makers) and market observer interact – the local
decisions ak taken by the agents determines the public belief
60.25 0.5 0.79 1.0
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−1
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1
pi(2)
V
(pi
)
0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0
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0.5
1
1.5
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2.5
3
pi(2)
µ
∗
(pi
)
Fig. 3. The value function V (pi) and the double threshold optimal policy
µ∗(pi) are plotted versus pi(2). The significance of the double threshold policy
is that the stopping regions are non-convex. The implication of the non-convex
stopping set for the market observer is that - if he believes that it is optimal
to stop, it need not be optimal to stop when his belief is larger.
pik and hence determines decision uk of the market observer
via (14).
From Theorem 2, the polytopes Pα1 ,Pα2 and Pα3 are subsets
of [0, 1]. Under (A1) and (A2), Pα3 = [0, pi∗∗(2)),Pα2 =
[pi∗∗(2), pi∗(2)),Pα1 = [pi∗(2), 1], where pi∗∗ and pi∗ are the
belief states at which Hα(2, 1) = Hα(2, 2) and Hα(1, 1) =
Hα(1, 2) respectively. From Theorem 2 and (17), the value
function can be written as,
V (pi) = min{C(pi, 1), C(pi, 2) + ρV (pi)I(pi ∈ Pα1 )
+ ρ
∑
a∈A
V (Tpi(pi, a))σ(pi, a)I(pi ∈ Pα2 )
+ ρV (pi)I(pi ∈ Pα3 )}
The explicit dependence of the filter on the belief pi results
in discontinuous value function. The optimal policy in general
has multiple thresholds and the stopping region in general is
non-convex.
Example: Fig. 3 displays the value function and optimal
policy for a toy example having the following parameters:
B =
[
0.8 0.2
0.3 0.7
]
, P =
[
1 0
0.06 0.94
]
, c =
[
1 2
2.5 0.5
]
.
The parameters for the market observer are chosen as: d =
1.25, f = [0 3], α = 0.8 and ρ = 0.9.
From Fig. 3 it is clear that the market observer has a double
threshold policy and the value function is discontinuous. The
double threshold policy is unusual from a signal processing
point of view. Recall that pi(2) depicts the posterior probability
of no change. The market observer “changes its mind” - it
switches from no change to change as the posterior probability
of change decreases! Thus the global decision (stop or con-
tinue) is a non-monotone function of the posterior probability
obtained from local decisions in the agent based model. The
example illustrates the unusual behaviour of the social learning
filter.
V. DATASET EXAMPLE
A. Tech Buzz Game and Model:
To validate the framework, we consider the data from Tech
Buzz Game, a stock market simulation launched by Yahoo!
Research and O’Reilly Media to gain insights into forecasting
high-tech events and trades. The game consisted of multiple
sub-markets trading stocks of contemporary rival technologies.
At each trading instant, the traders (or players) had access to
the search “buzz” around each of the stocks. The buzz was
an indicator of the number of users scouring Yahoo! search
on the stock over the past seven days, as a percentage of all
searches in the same market. Thus, if searches for the stock
named “SKYPE” make up 80 percent of all Yahoo! searches
in the telecommunication application software market, then
SKYPE’s buzz score is 80. The buzz scores of all technologies
within a market always add up to 100. The dataset was chosen
to demonstrate the framework as the trading information was
made available by Yahoo!.
The stock market simulation is modelled as follows. The
state X is chosen to represent value of the stock, with X = 1
indicating a high valued stock and X = 2 indicating a stock of
low value. It is well known that if the perceived value is more
then it is going to be popular. Hence, the noisy observations
are taken to be the buzz scores which are a proxy for the
popularity of the stock [50]. For tractability, is assumed that
all agents have the same attitude towards risk, i.e, α is the
same for all agents. The agents choose to buy (a = 1) or
sell (a = 2) depending on the cost and the belief updated
using the buzz score. On each day the stock is traded, we
consider only the agent which buys or sells maximum shares
and record its trading decision (positive or negative values
in the dataset) as buying or selling a unit of stock. This
is reasonable assumption in the sense that the agent trading
maximum shares (“big players” in finance) will significantly
influence the public belief.
B. Dataset
The buzz score for the stocks, SKYPE and IPOD trading in
markets VOIP and PORTMEDIA respectively, was obtained
for the period from April 1, 2005 to July 27, 2005 from the
Yahoo! Dataset 5. Value of the stock is basically a function of
the payout of the stock and its dividend [50]. The payout and
dividend are directly proportional to the buzz score. Using the
buzz score, value of the stock was calculated with the method
suggested in [50]. Space discretized value of the stocks SKYPE
and IPOD during the period is shown in the Fig. 4 and Fig.
7 along with the scaled buzz score.
1) Quickest detection for SKYPE: By eyeballing the data
in Fig. 4, it is seen that the value changed during the month
of June. To apply the quickest detection protocol, we consider
a window from May 17 to June 8. It is observed that the price
was (almost) constant during this period with a value close to
$13 per stock. The trading decisions (along with the value)
and the public belief during this period are shown in Fig. 5.
5“Yahoo! Webscope”, http://research.yahoo.com/Academic Relations
ydata-yrbuzzgame-transactions-period1-v1.0, ydata-yrbuzzgame-buzzscores-
period1-v1.0
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Fig. 4. Space discretized value of the stock SKYPE and the scaled buzz scores
during April - July is shown. It is seen that the value changed in the month
of June. The market observer’s aim is to detect the change in the value, i.e,
when xk = 1, using only the trading decisions.
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Fig. 5. The daily trading decisions of the agents is shown with the
corresponding belief update. Here a = 1 corresponds to buying and a = 2
corresponds to selling the stock. Since pi(2) ∈ [0, 0.354] is the stopping
region, it corresponds to pi(1) ≥ 0.646. The change was detected one day
after it occurred.
The local and global costs for the market observer were
chosen as:
c =
[
0.5 1
1 0.5
]
, f =
[
0 2
]
, d = 0.8
The model parameters were chosen as follows:
B =
[
0.7 0.3
0.3 0.7
]
, P =
[
1 0
0.04 0.96
]
.
The choice of the parameters for the observation matrix B
was motivated by the experimental evidence provided in [51],
that when there is social learning “alone”, the trading rate was
71% based on peer effects. Since the local decision likelihood
matrix Rpi = B in the social learning region (in our model),
the parameters were so chosen. Parameters in the transition
matrix P were chosen to reflect the time window considered,
as E{τ0} = 25.
It was observed that the state changed on June 6 and
for a risk-aversion factor of α = 0.45, it was detected
on June 7. The value function and the optimal policy for
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Fig. 6. Value function and the optimal policy plotted over pi(2) for α = 0.45.
Here pi∗∗ and pi∗ correspond to the boundary points of the social learning
region. µ∗(pi) = 1 corresponds to stop and µ∗(pi) = 2 corresponds to
continue. pi(2) ∈ [0, 0.354] corresponds to the stopping region.
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Fig. 7. Space discretized value of the stock IPOD and the scaled buzz scores
during April - July is shown. It is seen that the value changed during April
and July. The market observer’s aim is to detect the change in the value, i.e,
when xk = 1, using only the trading decisions.
the market observer are shown in Fig. 6. The stopping set
corresponds to pi(2) ∈ [0, 0.354]. The regions pi(2) ∈ [0, 0.34)
and pi(2) ∈ [0.76, 1] correspond to the regions where social
learning is absent. It can be observed that the value function
is discontinuous.
2) Quickest detection for IPOD: From Fig. 7, it is seen that
the value changed during April and July. To apply the quickest
detection protocol, we consider a window from July 2 to July
10. It is observed that the price was (almost) constant during
this period with a value close to $17 per stock. The trading
decisions (along with the value) and the public belief during
this period are shown in Fig. 8.
The local and global costs for the market observer were
chosen as:
c =
[
0.5 1
1 0.5
]
, f =
[
0 1.8
]
, d = 0.95
The model parameters were chosen as follows:
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Fig. 8. The daily trading decisions of the agents is shown with the
corresponding belief update. Here a = 1 corresponds to buying and a = 2
corresponds to selling the stock. Since pi(2) ∈ [0, 0.368] is the stopping
region, it corresponds to pi(1) ≥ 0.632. The change was detected on the day
it occurred with a higher penalty on the delay.
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Fig. 9. Value function and the optimal policy plotted over pi(2) for α = 0.45.
Here pi∗∗ and pi∗ correspond to the boundary points of the social learning
region. µ∗(pi) = 1 corresponds to stop and µ∗(pi) = 2 corresponds to
continue. pi(2) ∈ [0, 0.368] corresponds to the stopping region.
B =
[
0.7 0.3
0.3 0.7
]
, P =
[
1 0
0.11 0.89
]
.
Parameters in the transition matrix P were chosen to reflect
the time window considered, as E{τ0} = 9.
It was observed that the state changed on July 9 and for
a risk-aversion factor of α = 0.45, it was detected on July
9. It is seen that when the delay penalty is increased, the
change is detected on the same day. The value function and
the optimal policy for the market observer are shown in Fig.
9. The stopping set corresponds to pi(2) ∈ [0, 0.368].
VI. CONCLUSION
The paper provided a Bayesian formulation of the problem
of quickest detection of change in the value of a stock using the
decisions of socially aware risk averse agents. It highlighted
the reasons for this problem to be non-trivial - the stopping
region is in general non-convex; and it also accounted for the
agents’ risk attitude by considering a coherent risk measure,
CVaR, instead of the expected value measure in the agents’ op-
timization problem. Results which characterize the structural
properties of social learning under the CVaR risk measure were
provided and the importance of these results in understanding
the global behaviour was discussed. It was observed that the
behaviour of these risk-averse agents is, as expected, different
from risk neutral agents. Risk averse agents herd sooner and
don’t prefer to “learn” from the crowd, i.e, social learning
region is smaller the more risk-averse the agents are. Finally,
the model was validated using a financial dataset from Yahoo!
Tech Buzz game. From a signal processing point of view, the
formulation and solutions are non-standard due to the three
properties described in Section I.
In current work, we are interested in determining structural
results for the optimal change detection. Structural results for
POMDPs were developed in [36], [52] and it is worthwhile
extending these results to the current framework. When the
market observer incurs a measurement cost, quickest change
detection often has a monotone policy as described in [53]. It
is of interest to generalize these results to the current setup.
APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS:
Definition 1. MLR Ordering [54] (≥r): Let pi1, pi2 ∈ Π(X)
be any two belief state vectors. Then pi1 ≥r pi2 if
pi1(i)pi2(j) ≤ pi2(i)pi1(j), i < j, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , X}.
Definition 2. First-Order Stochastic Dominance (≥s): Let
pi1, pi2 ∈ Π(X) be any two belief state vectors. Then pi1 ≥s pi2
if
X∑
i=j
pi1(i) ≥
X∑
i=j
pi2(i) for j ∈ {1, . . . , X}.
Lemma 3. [54] pi2 ≥s pi1 iff for all v ∈ V , v′pi2 ≤ v′pi1,
where V denotes the space of X- dimensional vectors v, with
non-increasing components, i.e, v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . vX .
Lemma 4. [54] pi2 ≥s pi1 iff for all v ∈ V , v′pi2 ≥ v′pi1,
where V denotes the space of X- dimensional vectors v, with
non-decreasing components, i.e, v1 ≤ v2 ≤ . . . vX .
Let Π(X)∆={pi ∈ RX : 1′Xpi = 1, 0 ≤ pi(i) ≤ 1 for all i ∈
X}
Definition 3. Submodular function [49]: A function f :
Π(X) × {1, 2} → R is submodular if f(pi, u) − f(pi, u¯) ≤
f(p¯i, u)− f(p¯i, u¯), for u¯ ≤ u, pi ≥r p¯i.
Definition 4. Single Crossing Condition [49]: A function g :
Y ×A → R satisfies a single crossing condition in (y, a) if
g(y, a)− g(y, a¯) ≥ 0⇒ g(y¯, a)− g(y¯, a¯) ≥ 0
for a¯ > a and y¯ > y. For any such function g ,
a∗(y) = argmin
a
g(y, a) is increasing in y. (21)
9Theorem 5. [49] If f : Π(X)× {1, 2} → R is sub-modular,
then there exists a u∗(pi) = argmin
u∈{1,2}
f(pi, u) satisfying,
p¯i ≥r pi ⇒ u∗(pi) ≤ u∗(p¯i)
APPENDIX B
PROOFS
The following lemmas are required to prove Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2. The results will be proved for general state and
observation spaces having two actions.
Lemma 6. For a finite state and observation alphabet,
argmin
z∈R
{z + 1ζEy[max{(c(x, a) − z), 0}]} is equal to c(i, a)
for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X}.
Proof. Let ηy be the belief update (p.m.f) with observation
y, i.e, ηy(i) = Py(x = i). Let Fy(x) denote the cumulative
distribution function. For simplicity of notation, let hy(z) =
z + 1αEy[max{(c(x, a) − z), 0}]. The extremum of hy(z) is
attained where the derivative is zero. It is obtained as follows.
hy(z) = z +
1
α
Ey[max{(c(x, a)− z), 0}]
h′y(z) = 1 +
1
α
lim
∆z→0
Ey[max{c(x, a)− z −∆z, 0}]− Ey[max{(c(x, a)− z), 0}]
∆z
= 1 +
1
α
Ey
(
lim
∆z→0
max{c(x, a)− z −∆z, 0} −max{(c(x, a)− z), 0}
∆z
)
= 1 +
1
α
Ey
(
0× I0>(c(x,a)−z) − 1× I(c(x,a)−z)>0
)
= 1− 1
α
Py(c(x, a) > z).
Also, h′′y(z) =
1
α
d
dz
(Fy(z)) and therefore h′′y(z) ≥ 0. We
have, argmin
z∈R
{hy(z)} = {z : Py(c(x, a) > z) = α}. Since
X is a random variable, c(x, a) is a random variable with
realizations c(i, a) for i ∈ {1, . . . X}. Hence z = c(i, a) for
some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X}.
The result of Lemma 6 is similar to Proposition 8 in [55].
It was shown in [48] that ηy+1 ≥r ηy . Also, MLR dominance
implies first order dominance, i.e, ηy+1 ≥s ηy .
Lemma 7. Let l be the index such that argmin
z∈R
{hy(z)} =
c(l, a) and k be the index such that argmin
z∈R
{hy+1(z)} =
c(k, a). For all y ∈ {1, 2 . . . , Y }, k ≥ l.
Proof. Proof is by contradiction. From lemma (6), we have
Fy(c(l, a)) = 1−α and Fy+1(c(k, a)) = 1−α. Suppose l > k.
We know that Fy+1(z) is a monotone function in z. Since
l > k, Fy+1(c(l, a)) > 1− α. But, by definition of first order
stochastic dominance, Fy(z) ≥ Fy+1(z) for all z. Therefore,
Fy(c(l, a)) ≥ Fy+1(c(l, a)) > 1− α, a contradiction.
From lemma 6 and equation (19), we have
Hα(y, 2) = c(l, 2) +
1
α
l−1∑
i=1
ηy(i)(c(i, 2)− c(l, 2)),
Hα(y + 1, 2) = c(k, 2) +
1
α
k−1∑
i=1
ηy+1(i)(c(i, 2)− c(k, 2))
Lemma 8. Hα(y, 2) ≥ Hα(y + 1, 2) if α ≥ 1− Py(x = X).
Proof. From the definitions of Hα(y, 2) and Hα(y+ 1, 2) we
have,
Hα(y, 2)−Hα(y + 1, 2) = c(l, 2)− c(k, 2)+
1
α
l−1∑
i=1
ηy(i)(c(i, 2)− c(l, 2))+ 1
α
k−1∑
i=1
ηy+1(i)(c(k, 2)− c(i, 2))
≥ c(l, 2)− c(k, 2)+
1
α
l−1∑
i=1
ηy(i)(c(i, 2)− c(l, 2))+ 1
α
k−1∑
i=1
ηy(i)(c(k, 2)− c(i, 2))
(22)
Equation (22) follows from lemma 3 and can be simplified as
Hα(y, 2)−Hα(y + 1, 2) ≥ c(l, 2)− c(k, 2)+
1
α
l−1∑
i=1
ηy(i)(c(k, 2)− c(l, 2))+ 1
α
k−1∑
i=l
ηy(i)(c(k, 2)− c(i, 2))
≥ c(l, 2)− c(k, 2)− 1
α
Γ′ηy
where Γ is such that Γi = c(l, 2)− c(k, 2) for i = 1, . . . , l −
1 and Γi = c(i, 2) − c(k, 2) for i = l, . . . k − 1. Clearly,
Γi ≥ 0 and decreasing. Right hand side of inequality attains
its maximum when k = X and l = 1 and Γi = c(l, 2)−c(k, 2)
for all i. Therefore, we have
Hα(y, 2)−Hα(y + 1, 2) ≥ c(l, 2)− c(k, 2)− 1
α
Γ′ηy
≥ (c(l, 2)− c(k, 2))− 1
α
(c(l, 2)− c(k, 2))(1− Py(x = X))
After rearrangement we have,
Hα(y, 2)−Hα(y + 1, 2)
≥ α− (1− Py(x = X))
α
(c(l, 2)− c(k, 2))
Since α ≥ 1−Py(x = X) and (c(l, 2)− c(k, 2)) ≥ 0 (follows
from lemma 7 and assumption (A2)), we have Hα(y, 2) ≥
Hα(y + 1, 2).
From Lemma 6 and (19), we have
Hα(y, 1) = c(l, 1) +
1
α
X∑
i=l+1
ηy(i)(c(i, 1)− c(l, 1)),
Hα(y + 1, 1) = c(k, 1) +
1
α
X∑
i=k+1
ηy+1(i)(c(i, 1)− c(k, 1))
Lemma 9. Hα(y+1, 1) ≥ Hα(y, 1) if α ≥ 1−Py+1(x = X).
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Proof. From the definitions of Hα(y+ 1, 1) and Hα(y, 1) we
have,
Hα(y + 1, 1)−Hα(y, 1) = c(k, 1)− c(l, 1)+
1
α
X∑
i=k+1
ηy+1(i)(c(i, 1)− c(k, 1))− 1
α
X∑
i=l+1
ηy(i)(c(i, 1)− c(l, 1))
≥ c(k, 1)− c(l, 1) + 1
α
X∑
i=k+1
ηy+1(i)(c(i, 1)− c(k, 1))
− 1
α
X∑
i=l+1
ηy+1(i)(c(i, 1)− c(l, 1))
(23)
Equation (23) follows from lemma 4 and can be simplified as
Hα(y + 1, 1)−Hα(y, 1) ≥ c(k, 1)− c(l, 1)
+
1
α
X∑
i=k+1
ηy+1(i)(c(i, 1)− c(k, 1))
− 1
α
X∑
i=l+1
ηy+1(i)(c(i, 1)− c(l, 1))
≥ c(k, 1)− c(l, 1)− 1
α
∆′ηy+1
where ∆ is such that ∆i = c(i, 1)−c(l, 1) for i = l, . . . , k and
∆i = c(k, 1)−c(l, 1) for i = k+1, . . . X . Clearly, ∆i ≥ 0 and
decreasing. Right hand side of inequality attains its maximum
when k = X and l = 1 and ∆i = c(k, 1) − c(l, 1) for all i.
Therefore, we have
Hα(y + 1, 1)−Hα(y, 1)
≥ (c(k, 1)−c(l, 1))− 1
α
(c(k, 1)−c(l, 1))(1−Py+1(x = X))
After rearrangement we have,
Hα(y + 1, 1)−Hα(y, 1)
≥ α− (1− Py+1(x = X))
α
(c(k, 1)− c(l, 1)) (24)
Since α ≥ 1−Py+1(x = X) and c(k, 1)−c(l, 1) ≥ 0 (follows
from lemma 7 and assumption (A2)), we have Hα(y+1, 1) ≥
Hα(y, 1).
Lemma 10. Let α ≥ (1−Py(x = X)). The function Hα(y, a)
satisfies the single crossing condition i.e,
(Hα(y, 1)−Hα(y, 2)) ≥ 0⇒ (Hα(y+1, 1)−Hα(y+1, 2)) ≥ 0
Proof. Assume (Hα(y, 1)−Hα(y, 2)) ≥ 0. We have,
Hα(y, 1)−Hα(y, 2) ≥ 0
⇒ Hα(y, 1)−Hα(y + 1, 2) ≥ 0 (25)
Equation (25) follows from lemma 8. Also,
Hα(y, 1)−Hα(y + 1, 2) ≥ 0
⇒ Hα(y + 1, 1)−Hα(y + 1, 2) ≥ 0 (26)
Equation (26) follows from Lemma 9.
Lemma 10 is a crucial result which helps us to prove
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 1: From lemma 10, Hα(y, a) satisfies
the single crossing condition and hence is sub-modular in
(y, a). Using Theorem 5, we get a∗(pi, y) = argminHα(y, a)
is increasing in y.
Proof of Theorem 2: From lemma 10, Hα(y, a) satisfies the
single crossing condition. It is easily verified that the belief
states satisfy the following property
{pi : Hα(y, 1)−Hα(y, 2) ≥ 0}
⊆ {pi : Hα(y + 1, 1)−Hα(y + 1, 2) ≥ 0} (27)
Equation (27) says that the curves {pi : Hα(y, 1)−Hα(y, 2) =
0} for all y ∈ Y do not intersect. Also from (18) and
(27), it is easily verified that there are at most Y + 1 local
decision likelihood matrices Rpi (can be less than Y +1 when
Hα(y¯, 1) − Hα(y¯, 2) > 0 for some y¯ ∈ Y, for all pi). The
matrices Rpi from (18) and Theorem 1 are constant on each
of the Y + 1 polytopes.
REFERENCES
[1] B. LeBaron, “Agent-based computational finance,” Handbook of com-
putational economics, vol. 2, pp. 1187–1233, 2006.
[2] ——, “Agent-based computational finance: Suggested readings and early
research,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 24, no. 5,
pp. 679–702, 2000.
[3] E. Samanidou, E. Zschischang, D. Stauffer, and T. Lux, “Agent-based
models of financial markets,” Reports on Progress in Physics, vol. 70,
no. 3, p. 409, 2007.
[4] V. Alfi, M. Cristelli, L. Pietronero, and A. Zaccaria, “Minimal agent
based model for financial markets I,” The European Physical Journal
B, vol. 67, no. 3, pp. 385–397, 2009.
[5] L. Tesfatsion and K. L. Judd, Handbook of computational economics:
agent-based computational economics. Elsevier, 2006, vol. 2.
[6] R. Cont and J.-P. Bouchaud, “Herd behavior and aggregate fluctuations
in financial markets,” Macroeconomic Dynamics, vol. 4, pp. 170–196,
May 2000.
[7] C. Avery and P. Zemsky, “Multidimensional uncertainty and herd
behavior in financial markets,” American economic review, pp. 724–748,
1998.
[8] A. Park and H. Sabourian, “Herding and contrarian behavior in financial
markets,” Econometrica, vol. 79, no. 4, pp. 973–1026, 2011.
[9] C. Chamley, Rational herds: Economic Models of Social Learning.
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[10] R. Cont, “Volatility clustering in financial markets: Empirical facts and
agent–based models,” Long memory in economics; edited by A Kirman
and G Teyssiere (Springer), Apr 2007.
[11] F. LeGland and L. Mevel, “Exponential forgetting and geometric ergod-
icity in hidden Markov models,” Mathematics of Controls, Signals and
Systems, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 63–93, 2000.
[12] D. Challet, M. Marsili, and Y. Zhang, “Minority games: interacting
agents in financial markets,” OUP Catalogue, 2013.
[13] M. Cristelli, L. Pietronero, and A. Zaccaria, “Critical overview of agent-
based models for economics,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1101.1847, 2011.
[14] N. Apergis and S. M. Miller, “Do structural oil-market shocks affect
stock prices?” Energy Economics, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 569 – 575, 2009.
[15] S. Gilchrist, V. Yankov, and E. Zakrajek, “Credit market shocks and eco-
nomic fluctuations: Evidence from corporate bond and stock markets,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 471 – 493, 2009.
[16] S. Das and M. Magdon-Ismail, “Adapting to a market shock: Optimal
sequential market-making,” in Advances in Neural Information Process-
ing Systems, 2009, pp. 361–368.
[17] V. Krishnamurthy, “Quickest detection POMDPs with social learning:
Interaction of local and global decision makers,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 58, no. 8, pp. 5563–5587, 2012.
[18] P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J. Eber, and D. Heath, “Coherent measures of
risk,” Risk management: value at risk and beyond, p. 145, 2002.
11
[19] S. Bikchandani, D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch, “A theory of fads,
fashion, custom, and cultural change as information cascades,” Journal
of Political Economy, vol. 100, no. 5, pp. 992–1026, October 1992.
[20] I. Welch, “Sequential sales, learning, and cascades,” Journal of Finance,
pp. 695–732, 1992.
[21] A. Banerjee, “A simple model of herd behavior,” Quaterly Journal of
Economics, vol. 107, no. 3, pp. 797–817, August 1992.
[22] L. Glosten, “Insider trading, liquidity, and the role of the monopolist
specialist,” Journal of Business, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 211–235, Dec 1989.
[23] A. N. Shiryaev and A. Aries, Optimal stopping rules. Springer-Verlag,
2007, vol. 8.
[24] H. V. Poor and O. Hadjiliadis, Quickest Detection. Cambridge
University Press, 2008.
[25] M. Frise´n, “Optimal sequential surveillance for finance, public health,
and other areas,” Sequential Analysis, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 310–337, 2009.
[26] R. A. Cohn, W. G. Lewellen, R. C. Lease, and G. G. Schlarbaum,
“Individual investor risk aversion and investment portfolio composition,”
The Journal of Finance, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 605–620, 1975.
[27] B. . Donkers and A. Soest, “Subjective measures of household prefer-
ences and financial decisions,” Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 20,
no. 6, pp. 613 – 642, 1999.
[28] S. Mitra and T. Ji, “Risk measures in quantitative finance,” International
Journal of Business Continuity and Risk Management, vol. 1, no. 2, pp.
125–135, 2010.
[29] R. T. Rockafellar and S. Uryasev, “Optimization of conditional value-
at-risk,” Journal of risk, vol. 2, pp. 21–42, 2000.
[30] J. Palmquist, S. Uryasev, and P. Krokhmal, Portfolio optimization with
conditional value-at-risk objective and constraints. Department of
Industrial & Systems Engineering, University of Florida, 1999.
[31] C. Lim, H. D. Sherali, and S. Uryasev, “Portfolio optimization by
minimizing conditional value-at-risk via nondifferentiable optimization,”
Computational Optimization and Applications, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 391–
415, 2010.
[32] F. Andersson, H. Mausser, D. Rosen, and S. Uryasev, “Credit risk
optimization with conditional value-at-risk criterion,” 2001.
[33] Y. Feng, F. Rubio, and D. Palomar, “Optimal order execution for
algorithmic trading: A CVaR approach,” in Signal Processing Advances
in Wireless Communications (SPAWC), 2012 IEEE 13th International
Workshop on, June 2012, pp. 480–484.
[34] J. T. Tsai, J. L. Wang, and L. Y. Tzeng, “On the optimal product mix
in life insurance companies using conditional value at risk,” Insurance:
Mathematics and Economics, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 235–241, 2010.
[35] V. Krishnamurthy, “Bayesian sequential detection with phase-distributed
change time and nonlinear penalty – a lattice programming POMDP
approach,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 57, no. 3,
pp. 7096–7124, Oct. 2011.
[36] V. Krishnamurthy and H. V. Poor, “A tutorial on interactive sensing in
social networks,” IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems,
vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 3–21, March 2014.
[37] R. Forsythe, T. A. Rietz, and T. W. Ross, “Wishes, expectations and
actions: a survey on price formation in election stock markets,” Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 83–110, 1999.
[38] C. R. Plott and K.-Y. Chen, “Information aggregation mechanisms:
Concept, design and implementation for a sales forecasting problem,”
2002.
[39] R. H. Thaler and W. T. Ziemba, “Parimutuel betting markets: Racetracks
and lotteries,” Journal of Economic perspectives, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 161–
174, 1988.
[40] J. M. Gandar, W. H. Dare, C. R. Brown, and R. A. Zuber, “Informed
traders and price variations in the betting market for professional
basketball games,” Journal of Finance, pp. 385–401, 1998.
[41] A. Cartea and S. Jaimungal, “Modelling asset prices for algorithmic and
high-frequency trading,” Applied Mathematical Finance, vol. 20, no. 6,
pp. 512–547, 2013.
[42] A. N. Akansu and M. U. Torun, A Primer for Financial Engineering:
Financial Signal Processing and Electronic Trading. Academic Press,
2015.
[43] M. Avellaneda and S. Stoikov, “High-frequency trading in a limit order
book,” Quantitative Finance, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 217–224, Apr 2008.
[44] V. Krishnamurthy and A. Aryan, “Quickest detection of market shocks
in agent based models of the order book,” in Proceedings of the 51st
IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Maui, Hawaii, Dec. 2012.
[45] ——, “Detecting asset value dislocations in multi-agent models for
market microstructure,” in ICASSP 2013, May 2013.
[46] M. F. Neuts, Structured stochastic matrices of M/G/1 type and their
applications. N.Y.: Marcel Dekker, 1989.
[47] S. Karlin and Y. Rinott, “Classes of orderings of measures and related
correlation inequalities. I. Multivariate totally positive distributions,”
Journal of Multivariate Analysis, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 467–498, December
1980.
[48] W. S. Lovejoy, “Some monotonicity results for partially observed
Markov decision processes,” Operations Research, vol. 35, no. 5, pp.
736–743, Sept.-Oct. 1987.
[49] D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity. Princeton
University Press, 1998.
[50] Y. Chen, D. M. Pennock, and T. Kasturi, “An empirical study of dynamic
pari-mutuel markets: Evidence from the tech buzz game,” in Proceedings
of the Web Mining and Web Usage Analysis workshop (WebDKK), Las
Vegas, Nevada, 2008.
[51] L. Bursztyn, F. Ederer, B. Ferman, and N. Yuchtman, “Understanding
mechanisms underlying peer effects: Evidence from a field experiment
on financial decisions,” Econometrica, vol. 82, pp. 1273–1301, 2014.
[52] V. Krishnamurthy and D. Djonin, “Structured threshold policies for dy-
namic sensor scheduling–a partially observed Markov decision process
approach,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 55, no. 10, pp.
4938–4957, Oct. 2007.
[53] V. Krishnamurthy, “How to schedule measurements of a noisy Markov
chain in decision making?” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 59, no. 9, pp. 4440–4461, July 2013.
[54] A. Muller and D. Stoyan, Comparison Methods for Stochastic Models
and Risk. Wiley, 2002.
[55] R. T. Rockafellar and S. Uryasev, “Conditional value-at-risk for general
loss distributions,” Journal of banking & finance, vol. 26, no. 7, pp.
1443–1471, 2002.
